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NOTE
STATE V. BARNES-PROCEDURAL TECHNICALITIES OR JUSTICE?
The defendant appealed from a conviction for possession of
marijuana relying on various bills of exceptions reserved in the
trial court. On the original hearing the supreme court found no
merit in the bills reserved. On rehearing the court refused to
decide the merits of the issues presented, on the ground that
the bills of exceptions relied on did not meet the requirements
of article 844 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.1 Even though
the clerk had placed a notation on the bills of exceptions to the
page in the transcript where the bills were reserved, the court
held, that evidence merely placed physically in the record before
the supreme court cannot be considered unless it is attached to
or made a part of the formal bills of exceptions. State v. Barnes,
257 La. 1017, 245 So.2d 159 (1971).
The bill of exceptions has its roots in the common law.2
Since no transcript of the early common law trial was usually
taken, the bill of exceptions served the important purpose of
preserving the evidence surrounding the objection for the appel-
late judge's review.8 In time this formality became entrenched
in Louisiana jurisprudence. 4 Since no complete transcript of
1. LA. Cons CRIM. P. art. 844 provides:
"A. The appellate court shall consider only formal bills of exceptions
which have been signed by the trial judge in conformity with Article
845. In a case where the death sentence has been imposed, the appellate
court, to promote the ends of justice, may consider bills that have not
been timely signed by the trial judge.
"B. A formal bill of exceptions shall contain only the evidence neces-
sary to form a basis for the bill, and must show the circumstances and
the evidence upon which the ruling was based. When the same evi-
dence has been made part of another bill of exceptions, the evidence
may be incorporated by reference to the other bill. Evidence as to
guilt or innocence can only be taken down and transcribed as provided
by law."
2. State v. Pitre, 106 La. 606, 31 So. 133 (1902).
3. "When a defense objection was overruled, the defendant then
reserved a bill, the trial stopped, a reporter was called, and the evidence
surrounding the bill was taken down. Under such circumstances, the rule
became well established that the evidence surrounding the objection and
the bill be included in the formal bill of exception [sic]. If the evidence
was not there, within the bill, it was not in the record, supposedly. As
time passed and the evidence began to appear in the record on appeal as
a transcript of the entire testimony, the rule nevertheless received con-
tinued enforcement." State v. Barnes, 257 La. 1017, 1063, 245 So.2d 159, 175
(1971) (dissenting opinion).
4. See, e.g., State v. Callihan, 257 La. 298, 242 So.2d 521 (1970); State v.
Garner, 255 La. 115, 229 So.2d 719 (1969); State v. Moye, 250 La. 117, 194 So.2d
717 (1967); State v. Honeycutt, 218 La. 362, 49 So.2d 610 (1950); State v.
Pitre, 106 La. 606, 31 So. 133 (1902); State v. James, 106 La. 462, 31 So. 44
(1901).
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the trial was required, Act 113 of 1896 was passed to insure that
the evidence relating to the bill of exceptions would be pre-
served. 5 From the beginning, the Louisiana Supreme Court has
strictly applied this statute, and a formal bill of exceptions is
required before it will review the alleged error.6
Article 844 (B) 7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is the
present statutory basis for requiring inclusion of the evidence
in the formal bills of exceptions as a prerequisite for appellate
review. Failures to properly "perfect or preserve" bills of excep-
tions have taken a wide variety of forms. These include such
technical defects as an attorney reserving a bill of exceptions
in the trial court, duly preparing the formal bill and then failing
to get the trial judge's signature. 8 In State v. Holmes9 a bill of
exceptions was reserved, but the attorney failed to state in his
objection the reason the charge was erroneous. As a consequence,
the court refused to review the bill. A frequent and more sub-
stantial basis of refusals by the supreme court to review errors
is the failure of counsel, after reserving a bill of exceptions, to
take further action in perfecting a formal bill. As the court
stated in State v. Miller: '0
"It is well settled that the mere minute entry showing
the reservation of a bill of exception [sic] in a criminal case
cannot receive consideration in this court. The bill must be
written out and signed by the judge.""
It is important for the supreme court to have the facts and
5. "Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Louisiana:
That on the trial of all criminal cases in this State, appealable to the
Supreme Court, when an objection shall be made and a bill of exception
[sic] reserved, the court shall at the time and without delay order the
clerk to take down the facts upon which the bill has been retained, which
statement of facts shall be preserved among the records of the trial; and if
the case be appealed, the clerk shall attach to the bill of exception [sic) a
certified copy thereof, which shall be taken by the appellate court as a
correct statement upon which the exception Is based." La. Acts 1896, No.
113, § 1.
6. See State v. Cole, 161 La. 827, 109 So. 505 (1926); State v. Carmouche,
141 La. 325, 75 So. 68 (1917); State v. Varnado, 131 La. 952, 60 So. 627 (1913);
State v. Haines, 51 La. Ann. 731, 25 So. 372 (1899). See aZso LA. CODE CRIM. P.
art. 844, comment (a).
7. See note 1 supra.
8. E.g., State v. Cummings, 217 La. 672, 47 So.2d 41 (1950); State v. Miller,
146 La. 236, 83 So. 539 (1919).
9. 224 La. 941, 71 So.2d 335 (1954); accord, State v. Linam, 175 La. 865,
144 So. 600 (1932); State v. Ricks, 170 La. 507, 128 So. 293 (1930).
10. 146 La. 236, 83 So. 539 (1919).
11. Id. at 237, 83 So. at 539; accord, State v. Clark, 220 La. 946, 57 So.2d
904 (1952); State v. Cummings, 217 La. 672, 47 So.2d 41 (1950); State v. Smith,
149 La. 700, 90 So. 28 (1921); State v. Haines, 51 La. Ann. 731, 25 So. 372 (1899).
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circumstances surrounding the ruling complained of. If there
is a failure to include this evidence and information in the bill
of exceptions, the supreme court has consistently held that
nothing is presented for review.12
Notwithstanding this stricti juris interpretation in dealing
with bills of exceptions, there are instances where, in the inter-
est of justice, the court has relaxed its standards. One such case
in which this occurred is State v. Reed.' 8 The trial judge, com-
plying with the defense counsel's request, ordered the testi-
mony "taken down.' 4 The stenographer failed to record some
of the bills, and the testimony and objections to some of the
rulings were omitted; other bills were so ineptly done that the
record was in no form to enable the court to review the objec-
tions. Nevertheless, the court concluded:
"Counsel for the defendant apparently did all they were
required to do to preserve defendant's right of appeal. They
dictated their objections and bills to the stenographer and
had no reason at the time to suspect that her shorthand
notes when transcribed would not correctly set forth the
proceedings."'15
In another instance, State v. Alexander,"6 the trial judge failed
to certify at the foot of each bill his reason for not furnishing
a per curiam as he was required by statute to do. However, the
court still considered these bills.
Probably the most recent and clearest example of the court's
departure from its stricti juris rule is the 1971 capital case of
State v. Square." In Square counsel reserved a bill of excep-
tions to the trial judge's denial of his request to employ a private
physician, but failed to perfect it. The supreme court recognized
this case as an exception to the rule of article 844 (A) requiring
that only formal bills of exceptions may be considered on
appeal. 8 It demonstrated the liberal approach traditionally taken
12. State v. Thomas, 224 La. 431, 69 So.2d 738 (1953); State v. Jouvet, 224
La. 15, 69 So.2d 741 (1953); State v. Varnado, 131 La. 952, 60 So. 627 (1913);
State v. Pitre, 106 La. 606, 31 So. 133 (1902).
13. 180 La. 741, 157 So. 547 (1934).
14. Id. at 745, 157 So. at 548.
15. Id. at 746, 157 So. at 548.
16. 216 La. 932, 45 So.2d 83 (1950).
17. 257 La. 743, 244 So.2d 200 (1971).
18. Id. at 768, 244 So.2d at 209. LA. CODE CRiM. P. art. 844(A): "In a case
where the death sentence has been imposed, the appellate court, to promote




in capital cases by considering the bills on appeal even though
they were never presented to the trial judge for signing.19
In Barnes the defendant's formal bills of exceptions failed to
make reference to the part of the transcript which would show
the circumstances and nature of the ruling complained of. How-
ever, the clerk placed a notation on the bills signifying the page
of the transcript where the bills were reserved.20 In determining
that this notation by the clerk did not make the relevant portion
of the transcript a part of the record, and therefore refusing to
review it, the court concluded that there had been a failure to
perfect the bills of exceptions and that it had no authority to
consider them "since defense counsel did not make the general
charge, by attachment or otherwise, a part of Bill of Exceptions
No. 17."21
Apparently in Barnes the court was somewhat troubled
about the correctness of its original decision on the merits. In
fact, it is for that reason that a rehearing was granted. On
original hearing, the court had only considered the soundness
of the judge's charge without raising any question as to the
form or sufficiency of the formal bills of exceptions. Not until
rehearing did the court interpret the bills of exceptions in a
way which would preclude its review. The supreme court, how-
ever, has somewhat liberalized its application of article 844
requirements by allowing the incorporation of the evidence into
the bills by reference. The Barnes decision recognized this when
it stated:
"[W]e have squarely held that this Court can look only
to what is contained in the formal bills of exceptions for
19. "This case does not, in the strict sense, fall within the exception
contemplated by the article [844] since it does not present a situation where
a bill has been prepared and tardily presented to the judge for signing; but,
instead, the case at bar presents a situation where, although the bill was
reserved, it has never been either prepared or tardily presented for signing
by the Judge as Article 844 contemplates. In capital cases, however, this
Court has been particularly solicitious in preventing a technicality from
depriving a defendant of a review of the trial court proceedings .... We will
therefore pass upon the [exception]. In so doing we are not approving
the applicability of Article 844 to this fact situation." State v. Square, 257
La. 743, 768-69, 244 So.2d 200, 209 (1971).
20. "The page number referred to at the top of the page on which each
bill of exceptions appears, is . . . placed there by the clerk for the con-
venience of this Court, in accordance with the requirements of our Rule
I, Sec. 13." State v. Barnes, 257 La. 1017, 1044, 245 So.2d 159, 168-69 (1971).
21. Id. at 1038, 245 So.2d at 166.
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the reason that evidence, to be considered by us, must be
contained in a bill of exceptions, attached thereto, or incor-
porated in such bill by reference. ' '22
Incorporation by reference, as well as physical attachment of the
pertinent part of the transcript, makes the record of what hap-
pened fully and readily available to the reviewing court. It is
difficult to see why the same liberality should not apply where
the complete transcript is before the supreme court and a clerk's
notation on the formal bills of exceptions calls attention to the
portion of the transcript where the pertinent evidence and other
information are to be found. What difference should it make
whether the notations were placed there by the defendant or
the clerk? It would take little more effort for the court to look
to the page in the transcript referred to if it had been placed
there customarily by the clerk than it would had the defendant
incorporated it into his bill. The reference is before the court
in either case.
The supreme court's holding that the bill of exceptions was
inadequately presented could be condoned if there had not been
references to page numbers on the bills of exception. Obviously,
with its heavy docket, the supreme court would find it impos-
sible to read the entire transcript of every case before it in
search of the evidence supporting the bills of exceptions. In
attempting to justify its decision, the court also emphasized
the fact that none of the bills referred to the place where the
evidence surrounding the reservation could be found, but only
to the page where the bill was noted. This reasoning seems overly
technical. Clearly, the evidence around the reserving of a bill
can be found by simply turning a page when a complete tran-
script is before the court, because the supporting evidence will
be found immediately preceding the reservation of the bill.23
Justice Dixon very ably summed this point up in his dissent,
noting that when a complete transcript is before the court the
only utility in having such a restrictive interpretation of article
22. Id. at 1039, 245 So.2d at 167, citing supporting jurisprudence. (Court's
emphasis.)
23. It is important to remember, as pointed out by Justice Barham in
his dissent in State v. Garner, 255 La. 115, 127, 229 So.2d 719, 724 (1970),
that "[alrticle 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states: 'The provisions
of this Code are intended to provide for the just determination of criminal
proceedings. They shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fair-




844 is to trap the unwary civil lawyer not accustomed to the
perfection of appeals in criminal cases. 24
Also dissenting, Justice Tate pointed out that articles 843
and 844 should not be subjected to such hypertechnical inter-
pretation. The rationale of these articles is that even though
everything is transcribed in most judicial districts, some dis-
tricts do not require such transcription. Therefore, it appears
that the intention behind article 84325 was to make sure that
as much of the evidence as is necessary for appellate review
be placed before the court.
Interpreting these articles in such a restrictive and arti-
ficial way may also raise a question of due process,26 since the
enforcement of a procedural forfeiture must serve a legitimate
state interest. In Henry v. Mississippi,2 relied upon by Justice
Tate, there was apparently a legitimate state interest to protect;
there the objection at trial would have given the judge an
opportunity to correct his ruling and proceed without using
tainted evidence, thus preventing the possibility of reversal
and another trial. In Barnes, however, the legitimate state
interest is difficult to ascertain. The defendant reserved bills of
exceptions at trial, giving the judge a chance to reconsider his
rulings. He perfected bills of exceptions and included everything
he thought necessary to preserve the question on appeal. A com-
plete transcript of pertinent evidence and procedures followed
was before the supreme court. These factors prompted Justice
Tate's criticism on the grounds that the decision offends funda-
24. "There is no longer any utility In the perpetuation of the rule
that the formal bill of exceptions must contain within it the evidence
surrounding the ruling complained of. The record before us is complete.
It is correctly and efficiently indexed. The only utility of the rstrictive
[sic] rule is to trap the unwary civil lawyer unaccustomed to the perfection
of appeals in criminal cases. The rule, in my opinion, is antiquated and
outmoded, serving no useful purpose today. I find no reasonable relationship
between the rule and its stated objective. I cannot subscribe to it. The
rule should be changed to insure for the defendant a fair chance that his
points on appeal will be reviewed." State v. Barnes, 257 La. 1017, 1066-67,
245 So.2d 159, 177 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
25. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 843: "When a bill of exceptions is reserved,
the clerk or the court stenographer shall immediately take down the ob-
jection, the ruling, and the facts upon which the objection is based. The
matters, so taken down, shall be preserved among the records of the trial,
shall constitute the bill of exceptions, and shall be a basis for a formal
bill of exceptions."
26. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965); accord, Terry v. Peyton,
433 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1970); Gann v. Smith, 318 F. Supp. 409 (N.D. Miss.
1970); Roper v. Beto, 318 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Tex. 1970); United States
ex rel. Sanders v. Ziegler, 319 F. Supp. 492 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
27. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
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mental notions of fairness and that it was reached by applying
outmoded technicalities. 28
Technical constructions which deprive a diligent defendant
of his right to appellate review raise substantial questions as
to the soundness of Louisiana's bill of exceptions procedures.
The answer may be a more liberal approach by the supreme
court, legislative simplification of the bill of exceptions pro-
cedures, or perhaps adoption of the federal system which has
done away with bills of exceptions altogether. Under Rule 51
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the only require-
ment for an appeal is the filing of a simple notice of appeal.2
Accordingly, the federal rule "was intended to take the place
of more complicated procedures to obtain review, and the notice
should not be used as a technical trap for the unwary drafts-
man."8 0 Even though much simplification has been accomplished,
many of the other requirements for appeal that have long been
recognized by appellate courts are still maintained. For example,
the court will not review an error on appeal that was not
objected to previously at trial.81 Although technical omissions
in the notice of appeal will not deprive appellant of his right
of review, "[w]here the appeal is taken specifically only from
one part of the judgment the appellate court has no jurisdic-
tion to review the portion not appealed from. '3 2 There is still
28. "This conviction, and especially the judicial review of it, offends
fundamental notions of fairness. The majority avoids facing the substantial
contentions that may justify a reversal, through applying outmoded techni-
calities." State v. Barnes, 257 La. 1017, 1048, 245 So.2d 159, 170 (1971) (dis-
senting opinion).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (1964); Martin v. United States, 263 F.2d 516 (10th
Cir. 1959).
30. Donovan v. Esso Shipping Co., 259 F.2d 65, 68 (3d Cir. 1958); accord,
Jones v. Chaney & James Constr. Co., 399 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1968).
31. "In Yeater v. United States, 397 F.2d 975 (9th Cir. 1968) this court
said: [We rest) our aifirmance of the conviction upon the well-established
rule of appellate review that defenses not raised in the district court will
not be considered on appellate review. . . . 'The very purpose of such a rule
is to enable the court to consider it below-to prevent error-to avoid
appeal.' Grant v. U.S., 291 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1961). An important reason for
the Rule 51 principle Is the avoidance of delay. If the lower tribunal is
given a fair opportunity to consider and decide the question, there will
frequently be no necessity for an appeal, which, when It occurs, results
in delay. Another reason is that of fairness to the lower tribunal. A re-
versal of a decision of a lower court, In a case in which that court did
not have a fair opportunity to weigh the conflicting considerations which
are presented to the Court of Appeals, Is an affront to the dignity of the
lower court." United States v. Fix, 429 F.2d 619, 620 (9th Cir. 1970).
32. Donovan v. Esso Shipping Co., 259 F.2d 65, 68 (3d Cir. 1958); accord,
Gannon v. American Airlines, Inc., 251 F.2d 476 (10th Cir. 1958); Carter v.
Powell, 104 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 611 (1939).
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a time limitation for filing a notice of appeal8 8 as there is in
many jurisdictions outside the federal area. To keep the federal
appellate court from having to read the entire transcript, some-
thing was needed to direct the court's attention to the pertinent
portions of the record.84 This was achieved by a document known
as the appendix: "It is exactly what its name implies: an adden-
dum to the briefs for the convenience of the judges."8 In essence,
under the federal rules, the entire record is always before the
appellate court for reference and examination.86
Probably the best solution of the bill of exceptions' "trap
for the unwary civil lawyer" is through the supreme court's
inherent power to relax its rules and adopt a more flexible inter-
pretation of article 844. These procedures could be liberalized
by the court to allow consideration of bills of exceptions in cases
such as Barnes where the complete transcript is before the
court and the pertinent material is located, whether by specific
defense incorporation by reference or by a clerk's notation on
the bill of exceptions. Therefore, it appears that this particular
injustice can be remedied more suitably by the court itself,
keeping in mind legislative modification as a last resort.
J. Kirby Barry
33. FED. R. App. P. 4(b).
34. Symposium on the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure-The
Appendix to the Briefs: Rule S0 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
28 FED. B.J. 116 (1968).
35. Id.-The Federal RuWe8 of Appellate Procedure, 28 FED. B.J. 100,
108 (1968).
36. FED. R. App. P. 30(b).
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